



THE 2026 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD

Factsheet / June 2026


This document contains a selection of graphs with quantitative data from the 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard.



See the complete 2026 EU Justice Scoreboard at: <https://link.europa.eu/CDVwyV>

EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE SYSTEMS


Figure 2 Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2014, 2022 – 2024 (*) (first instance/ per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)



(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes about contracts. Non-litigious civil/commercial cases concern uncontested proceedings, e.g. uncontested payment orders.

For proceedings before the national competition authorities, **eight Member States** reported that proceedings took less than 1 000 days.


Figure 16 Competition: average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities in 2020, 2022 – 2024 (*) (in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network)



(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. Since the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, the average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities has been calculated as follows: the number of days between the first formal investigative measure and the adoption of a final decision by the national competition authority (by the administrative authority or, in Member States with a judicial system, by the court that has the power to adopt a prohibition decision and/or impose or confirm fines). For this reason, the data since the 2024 edition in the above figure cannot be compared to the data published in earlier editions. This calculation method allows for comparable data at EU level for the sole purpose of the EU Justice Scoreboard and may differ from the reporting at national level in certain Member States. **CZ** and **SK** have a two-instance administrative procedure. When appealed, first instances decisions are reviewed by the second instance body of the authority, which may prolong proceedings. **DK**: In 2021, following the transposition of the ECN+ Directive, Denmark moved from a purely criminal enforcement system to a system where the Danish competition authority can now directly apply for the imposition of a fine before a civil court and adopt settlement decisions in its own administrative proceedings. This has led to an increase in decisions since 2022. For **AT**, **DK** and **FI**, the length of proceedings covers the combined duration of proceedings before the administrative and judicial national competition authorities. **AT**: data include proceedings involving to a large-scale cartel in the construction sector. Due to the size of this case, proceedings triggered by the same first investigative measure were (and still are being) led and concluded successively, gradually distorting the average length of proceedings. **ES** and **IT**: data excludes commitment decisions adopted by the national competition authority. **IE**: Not applicable for 2020, 2021 and 2022, as the CCPC did not have the power to make its own binding administrative decisions in antitrust cases until September 2023 (prior to that date, it could only take enforcement action in such cases through the courts). **SK**: Article 102: four decisions of first instance and 0 decisions of appellate body (total: 1 117 days); Article 101: 0 decisions of first instance and one decision of appellate body (total: 1 730 days). Average length of proceedings is therefore 1 423 days.

Looking at 2024 data, proceedings are concluded within about a year in **six Member States**, in **10 Member States** proceedings last between a year and 2 years, while in **four** others where data are available, proceedings can last two years or more.

Figure 21 Corruption (bribery): average length of court cases from 2021 – 2024 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption)



(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. No reply to this question from **DE**, **IE**, **ES**, **IT**, **CY**, **MT**, **NL**: In this calculation for 2022, the period starts to run from the date the public prosecution service summons the defendant to appear in court; the period ends on the day when the judge of first instance delivers the final verdict. The average processing time for the aforementioned 35 cases is 645 days. However, account must be taken of the fact that a case is often not ready for the hearing at the moment the period starts to run. As a result, it takes some time before the case is presented for hearing. The average length from first hearing until delivery of the final verdict is 194 days. **FR**: Data from 2024 were calculated using a new method, therefore the multiannual average is not possible. The average delay is calculated from the prosecution decision by the prosecutor and not from the referral to the trial court. The opening of the judicial information is considered as a decision to initiate prosecution. The figure provided corresponds to the average duration reported by the French authorities (which reflects the duration from prosecution to judgment, excluding and including the "instruction" proceedings). It is not possible in all cases to calculate a timeframe by taking as the starting point the moment when the charges become final, as certain procedures (particularly those involving an "instruction") can take several years and may sometimes result in the case being dropped.

QUALITY OF JUSTICE SYSTEMS

Figure 29 presents specific arrangements for representative actions protecting the collective interests of consumers. It shows that **24 Member States** have at least one such measure in place. From among the selected measures, specific arrangements to inform consumers about the actions and the outcomes is the most widespread, being in place in **18 Member States**.

Figure 29 Specific arrangements for representative actions protecting the collective interests of consumers, 2024 (source: European Commission)





Figure 30 shows that **all Member States** have some specific arrangements for child-friendly justice and proceedings, for both civil and criminal/juvenile justice proceedings. **11 Member States** have **all nine** of the monitored specific arrangements in place, including, for example, a website specifically designed to be child-friendly and helplines to provide information about the justice system or measures in place to hold children separately from adults when they are deprived of their liberty. In **all Member States**, the privacy and personal data of children involved in judicial or non-judicial proceedings are protected in accordance with national law. Furthermore, **all Member States** have child-friendly specialised settings/hearings, where children can be heard.

Figure 30 Specific arrangements for child-friendly justice/proceedings: 2024 (source: European Commission)



Figure 45 Digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in civil/commercial and administrative cases, 2025 (*) (source: European Commission (*))




(*) The Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 48) shows that the perception of independence of courts and judges has improved or remained stable in 20 Member States when compared to 2016. On the other hand, compared to last year, the general public's perception of independence improved or remained stable in 17 Member States while it decreased in nine Member States. In two Member States, the level of perceived independence remained particularly low.

Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection

Compared to last year, the general public's perception of independence improved or remained stable in **17 Member States**.

Figure 48 How the general public perceives the independence of courts and judges (*) (source: Eurobarometer (*) – 2026)




(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very good' or 'fairly good' (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of 'total good', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad' (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and 'very good' then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very bad'.

(*) The Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 48) shows that the perception of independence of courts and judges has improved or remained stable in 20 Member States when compared to 2016. On the other hand, compared to last year, the general public's perception of independence improved or remained stable in 17 Member States while it decreased in nine Member States. In two Member States, the level of perceived independence remained particularly low.

Compared with last year, companies' perception of independence improved or remained stable in **18 Member States**.


Figure 50 How companies perceive the independence of courts and judges (*) (source: Eurobarometer – 2026)



(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very good' or 'fairly good' (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad' (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very good'; if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and 'very good', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is 'very bad'.

Compared to last year, confidence in investment protection improved in **15 Member States**.

Figure 52 How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts (*) (source: Eurobarometer - 2026)




(*) Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly confident in investment protection by the law and courts (total confident); if some Member States have the same percentage of total confident, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that they are 'fairly unconfident' or 'very unconfident' in the effectiveness of investment protection (total unconfident); if some Member States have the same percentage of total confident and total unconfident, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that they are 'very confident' in the effectiveness of investment protection; if some Member States have the same percentage of total confident, total unconfident and 'very confident', then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that they are 'very unconfident' in the effectiveness of investment protection.

Other indicators relevant for the single market

Figure 61 shows the term of appointment of the members and presidents of the first instance public procurement review bodies, namely whether they are appointed for an unlimited term, or for a limited term, and in this case whether it is renewable or non-renewable. In the **majority of Member States**, the term of members and presidents of the first instance review bodies is from 4 to 8 years and renewable.

Figure 61 First instance public procurement review bodies: term of appointment of members and president (*) (source: European Commission with the Network of First Instance Review Bodies on Public Procurement)



BE IE FR IT LT LU NL AT PT FI SE BG CZ DK DE EE EL ES HR CY LV HU PL SI RO SK MT


For each Member State:

1. First (left) column represents the term of appointment for members;
2. Second (right) column represents the term of appointment for presidents.

- Members/President appointed for a limited term, which can be renewed
- Members/President appointed for a limited term (non-renewable)
- Members appointed for an unlimited term

(*) The chart refers to the bodies listed under Figure 61 in the 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. **BG**: members and president: seven-year term (cannot be re-elected immediately for another term). The 2025 amendments to the Protection of Competition Act introduced a specific transitional arrangement concerning the terms of the members of the Commission on Protection of Competition. Pursuant to this arrangement, upon the expiry of the mandate of the current composition of the Commission, at the subsequent election three of its members shall be elected for a term of three years and six months. Upon the expiry of this term, new members shall be elected in their place in accordance with the established procedure and for the term of office provided for in Article 4(1) of the Act (seven years). This regulatory approach aims to introduce a staggered renewal of the Commission's composition by differentiating the duration of mandates, thereby ensuring institutional continuity and stability in its functioning. **CZ**: the Office does not have formally established members of the first instance public procurement review body. In practice, the administrative proceedings on review of public procurement are conducted by departments headed by directors; there are three such departments/directors in total. These directors are appointed/ dismissed in accordance with the Public Service Act. The same applies to the members of the departments – public officials who are appointed and dismissed in accordance with the Public Service Act. The president (the vice-chair of the Office): six-year term (unlimited number of terms). The president of the Office for the Protection of Competition acts as the second instance administrative review body. **DK**: members and president: four-year term (unlimited number of terms). **DE**: members and president: five-year term (unlimited number of terms). **EE**: members and president: five-year term (unlimited number of terms). **EL**: members and president: five-year term (not more than two terms). **ES**: members and president: six-year term (non-renewable). **HR**: members and president: five-year term (they may be appointed for two terms). **CY**: members and president: five-year term (may be renewed for one additional term). **LV**: members: unlimited term; president: five-year term (not more than two successive terms). **HU**: members: unlimited term; the president (the chair and the deputy chair of the Arbitration Board) five-year term (unlimited number of terms). **PL**: members: unlimited term; president: three-year term (unlimited number of terms). **SI**: members and president: eight-year term (according to the law, the number of terms is not limited, although in practice, none of the members has been appointed for more than two terms). **RO**: members: unlimited term; president: three-year term (not more than two terms). **SK**: members: unlimited term; vice-chair: five-year term (not more than two successive terms); The Public Procurement Office does not have formally established members of the first instance public procurement review body. In practice, the administrative proceedings on review of public procurement are conducted by the review department headed by director and the vice-chair for the strategic agenda. The director of the review department is appointed/ dismissed in accordance with the Public Service Act. The same applies to members of the review department – public officials who are appointed and dismissed in accordance with the Public Service Act. The vice-chair for the strategic agenda is appointed and dismissed by the Government upon proposal by the head of the Office of the Government. The president of the Public Procurement Office acts as the second instance administrative review body.

Figure 63 Supreme audit institutions: access to information in law and practice (*) (source: European Commission with the Contact Committee on Supreme Audit Institutions)




- Reported obstacles to access to information in practice
- No reported obstacles to access information in practice
- Law guarantees unrestricted access to information

(*) On Restrictions: PL: access to information prescribed as privileged by law is excluded or limited; **CY, CZ, NL**: restrictions resulting from limitations/lack of clarity as to the SAI mandate; **EL, FI**: restrictions due to technical difficulties; **BG, CZ, EL**: obstacles/delays due to administrative practices; **CY, NL, PL**: SAIs report obstacles due to administrative practice; **CY, EL, ES, NL, FI**: obstacles when auditing central banks and financial institutions; **BE, IT, LT, NL, EL, AT, CY, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, HU, MT, PL, PT, SK**: auditees invoke rules on personal data protection and/or confidentiality to contest access. **MT**: no right to access information from private companies.

Figure 68 shows that a transparency register on lobbying exists in **16 Member States**. It also presents information on who is obliged to conduct the registration.

Figure 68 Transparency registers on lobbying (*) (Source: European Commission with the national contact points for anti-corruption)



(*) **BE**: Different rules may apply at the regional level. **ES**: For regional and local level, regional regulations apply, with some Autonomous Communities establishing transparency registers and obligations on contacts with lobbyists. **IT**: Some ministries and government departments maintain meeting registers (e.g. the stakeholder register (Transparency Register) of the Ministry of Enterprise and of 'Made in Italy' Product). At the subnational level, several regions have adopted legislation on lobbying. The Chamber of Deputies has adopted its own Transparency Register, and its list of registered entities is freely available on the institution's website and is maintained by the office of the Presidency. **LV**: Amendments to lobbying transparency laws introduce a transitional period (2025–2028). From September 1, 2028, a mandatory Register of Interest Representation and Declaration System will launch, with data publicly available. Voluntary registration is possible via the Enterprise Register (Latvian Open Data Portal). **HU**: Government Decree No. 50/2013 (II. 25.) on the integrity management system of public administration bodies and the reception of stakeholders regulates the management of integrity and corruption risks for public administration bodies and their employees under the direction or supervision of the Government and members of the Government. The Government Decision 1025/2024 (II. 14.) on the adoption of the medium-term National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2025 and the related action plan set several tasks in relation to the regulation of lobbying activities. The Government invited the bodies concerned a) to prepare codes of ethics; and b) provide training on integrity awareness, taking into account the content of the code of ethics established under point a). The Government invites the Minister of Justice to ensure that the new lobbying law is drafted taking into account international recommendations. The Government instructs the Minister for Public Administration and Regional Development to prepare, with the involvement of the ministers concerned, a methodology guide on the interaction of local governments with lobbyists with a view to identifying and promoting best practices. **NL**: There is no such register but other instruments are in place to promote integrity and transparency, including publicising the agendas of ministers and lobby paragraphs in legislative processes. An evaluation of these instruments has taken place. The Government has indicated in their coalition agreement that it intends to implement a lobbying register that is workable and practical for both Government officials and lobbyists. The government is currently working on a proposal for the implementation. **PL**: For the purposes of this chart, a transparency register is in place despite national rules being more limited in practice. According to the Law on lobbying activities in the process of lawmaking a register of entities performing professional lobbying activities is maintained by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, which is public. Every public institution specifies the detailed manner of conduct of employees when handling matters with entities performing professional lobbying activities or carrying out activities falling within the scope of such activities without registration in the register of entities performing professional lobbying activities, consisting of representing the interests of persons or entities for which they act, including the manner of documenting the contacts undertaken. Every public institution is obliged to prepare annually public information on activities involving these authorities in the previous year and entities engaged in professional lobbying. The information must be made immediately available in the Public Information Bulletin **RO**: Voluntary registration in RUTI for decision-makers and lobbyists. Mandatory for some officials to register in RUTI and disclose meetings (names, date/location, purpose, and topics discussed). Members of Parliament (deputies/senators) must register and only meet registered third parties for legislative lobbying according to Law 197/2025. Third parties engaging with members of Parliament must register in RUTI (annual updates). **SE**: There are no lobbying registers but the principle of public access to official documents is applicable to all Government activity. Any document related to lobbying activities (such as invitations and other correspondence, visitor logs etc) are as a general rule public and can be disclosed to the public on request, unless a specific provision on secrecy that entails confidentiality on information in the document applies. The grounds for secrecy are strictly regulated.